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CONTROLLING IMPRUDENT LOCK-UPS:
THE NECESSITY FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Target companies often employ the lock-up as a defensive tactic to
combat hostile tender offers or takeover bids.1 A lock-up is an arrange-
ment between the target company (the "target") and a friendly suitor
(the "white knight") that gives the latter a decided advantage in bidding
for the target.2
In a lock-up, a white knight purchases or receives an option to
purchase either a principal asset of the target (an asset lock-up)3 or a
specified amount of the target's treasury or authorized but unissued stock
(a stock lock-up).4 Both types of lock-ups serve a three-fold purpose.
First, they tempt a white knight to enter into an amicable5 and reason-
1. See Note, Swallowing the Key to Lock-up Options, 14 U. TOL. L. REv. 1055, 1056 n.9
(1983). For a list of defensive tactics and common vocabulary associated with tender offers and
defenses, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 569-71 (1983); see also F.
ARANOW & H. EINHORN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 193-
202 (1977).
For law review articles discussing lock-ups, see Fleischer & Sternberg, Corporate Acquisitions, 12
REV. SEC. REG. (S & P) 937 (1979); Fraidin & Franco, Lock-Up Arrangements, 14 REV. SEC. REG.
(S & P) 821 (1981); Nathan, Lock-Ups and Leg-Ups: The Search for Security in the Acquisition
Market Place, THIRTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 13 (1981); Note, Tender Offer Defensive
Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621 (1983).
2. 1 A. FLEISCHER, JR., TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 326
(1983). One commentator contends that the word "lock-up" is a misnomer because the defensive
tactic does not actually lock-up a deal. He asserts that a more appropriate name is a "leg-up"
because lock-ups "do not preclude competition, but only deter it." Nathan, supra note 1, at 18.
3. The principal asset of a corporation is commonly known as the crown jewel. See Note,
Developments in Corporate Takeover Techniques: Creeping Tender Offers, Lock-up Arrangements,
and StandstillAgreements, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1095, 1108 (1982). An asset lock-up is particu-
larly effective because the hostile bidder usually expects to make use of and profit from the asset.
Locking up the crown jewels usually eliminates the hostile party's motive for acquiring the target. A
tender offer aggressor is not interested in ultimately receiving monetary compensation for the sale of
the asset regardless of the price paid for the asset. Id. at 1108 n.81; see also Note, supra note 4, at
1069.
4. The stock price typically is fixed lower than the prices likely to be offered by competing
bidders once the bidding heats up. See Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1068 (1983). The stock lock-up dilutes the percentage of shares held by a hostile
tender offeror and places target shares with a party that will not tender its shares to the hostile party.
Lock-ups give to the white knight a competitive advantage and increase the cost and difficulty to
hostile suitors of obtaining the requisite shares for control. A substantial stock lock-up thus may
deter potential hostile competitors and avoid a bidding war. See Freund & Volk, Developments on
Offense, ELEVENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 13, 27-28 (1979); see generally A. FLEISCHER, supra
note 2, at 223-28, 230-32.
5. See Note, supra note 4, at 1108 n.79.
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ably certain merger.6 Second, lock-ups permit the target to use discre-
tion in selecting a merger partner and also obtain a premium for its stock
or principal asset.7 Third, and most importantly, they deter hostile
tender offerors from attempting to acquire the target by making the tar-
get an unattractive acquisition for anyone other than the white knight.8
Unsuccessful tender offerors recently began to challenge the legality of
lock-ups, asserting that lock-ups constitute a manipulative practice in vi-
olation of section 14(e) of the Williams Act (the "Act").9 These chal-
lenges have raised three statutory issues: What constitutes a
manipulative practice under the Williams Act? What is the purpose of
the Williams Act? Does the Williams Act regulate defensive tactics di-
rectly or does it only require full and fair disclosure?
The Second and Sixth Circuits have suggested conflicting answers to
these questions.10 This Note examines the split between these circuits"1
and concludes that in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 2 the Second
Circuit correctly interpreted the scope of the Williams Act to preclude
the Act from regulating disclosed lock-ups.13
This Note also suggests that a state law action for breach of fiduciary
6. See Note, Lock-up Enjoined Under 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 12 SETON HALL L.
REV. 881, 882 (1982); see also Nathan, supra note 1, at 16. But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.) (lock-up did not prevent hostile merger), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 550
(1983).
7. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 2, at 323.
8. Id. See supra notes 3 & 4. But see Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d
Cir.) (lock-up failed to prevent hostile suitor from acquiring target), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550
(1983).
9. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550
(1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 336 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490
(1982).
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e) (1982), provides in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawfulfor any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or
in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
Id. (emphasis added).
10. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550
(1983); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490
(1982).
11. See infra notes 16-57 and accompanying text.
12. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983); see infra notes 43-57 and accom-
panying text.
13. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
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duty does not provide aggrieved parties with an adequate alternative
remedy. These suits are ineffective because the business judgment rule
effectively shields target management from 'inquiries into whether they
have breached their fiduciary duty."4 Finally, after concluding that fed-
eral legislation is necessary to provide target shareholders with an effec-
tive remedy against self-interested management, this Note proposes
specific guidelines to regulate defensive tactics to hostile tender offers. 15
I. SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS
A. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.16
In October, 1981, Mobil Corporation ("Mobil") made a cash tender
offer for a controlling interest in Marathon Oil Company ("Mara-
thon"). 7 Marathon directors regarded the tender offer as undesirable
and proceeded to search for a more attractive merger with a friendly
suitor." After conducting negotiations with several companies, Mara-
thon chose United States Steel Corporation ("U.S. Steel") as its white
knight, and entered into a merger agreement containing both stock and
asset lock-up provisions. t9 U.S. Steel received an irrevocable stock op-
tion to buy ten million authorized but unissued shares of Marathon2 ° and
an option to purchase Marathon's crown jewel, its interest in the Yates
Oil Field.2 U.S. Steel also made a tender offer for slightly more than
14. See infra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
16. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1490 (1982).
17. Id. at 367. Mobil's offer was for 40 million shares at $85 per share. Because Marathon only
had 58,685,906 common shares outstanding, a successful Mobil tender offer would have transferred
control. Id. at 375. Mobil tried to ensure the control transfer by conditioning its tender offer on the
purchase of at least 30 million shares. IL at 367. The cash tender offer was only the first step in
Mobil's ultimate plan to merge with Marathon. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The offer was pegged at $90 per share. Id.
21. Id. The crown jewel option could not be exercised unless U.S. Steel's tender offer failed and
a third party took control of Marathon. Id. Marathon had almost a one-half interest in Yates Field.
Yates Field is "one of the world's most remarkable oil fields." 1d. (citation omitted). That other
potential white knights sought options to buy Marathon's interest in Yates Field indicates the signifi-
cance of the field. Id. at 368.
Although U.S. Steel would have paid $2.8 billion for the Yates Field interest under the option
plan, competing tender offerors were primarily interested in the asset itself and not in any monetary
compensation. Failure to obtain the Yates Field would deter potential buyers from entering or con-
tinuing the bidding. Id. at 375. In fact, the court's invalidation of the lock-ups was a condition
precedent of Mobil's counter tender offer. Id. at 369; see infra text accompanying note 24.
Washington University Open Scholarship
94 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
half of Marathon's outstanding shares.22 U.S. Steel and Marathon fully
disclosed the transaction in compliance with federal securities law.23
In response to Marathon's arrangement with U.S. Steel, Mobil made a
counter tender offer to become effective only if the courts enjoined both
the stock and asset lock-ups.24 Mobil unsuccessfully brought an action
to enjoin the lock-ups in the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Ohio. The district court determined that the lock-ups in
the Marathon-U.S. Steel agreement were not manipulative acts violative
of section 14(e) of the Williams Act.2" The Sixth Circuit, however, re-
versed and held that both the stock and Yates Field option lock-ups,
individually and together, fell within the prohibition against manipula-
tive practices in section 14(e) of the Williams Act.26
The Sixth Circuit in Marathon recognized that the question whether
lock-ups constitute -a manipulative practice was a matter of first impres-
sion in the courts of appeals.27 After acknowledging that neither the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 nor the Williams Act defines manipula-
tive acts,28 the court examined the Supreme Court's consideration of the
word "manipulative" in the analogous context of rule lOb-5 actions.
Against this background, the court determined that conduct that artifi-
cially affects the normal market activity for securities constitutes "ma-
nipulative acts or practices."29
In applying its definition to the facts in Marathon, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the Yates Field lock-up severely curtailed the price Mo-
22. The offer was for 30 million shares at $125 per share. Id. at 367.
23. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio found that the disclo-
sures met the requirement set forth in section 14(e) of the Williams Act. Id. at 370. The Sixth
Circuit did not disturb the finding. Id. at 369 n.3.
24. The counter offer was for $126 per share. Id. at 369.
25. Id. at 370.
26. Id. at 375. The Sixth Circuit tacitly accepted the district court's finding that both the
Marathon and the U.S. Steel tender offer disclosures complied with section 14(e). Id. at 370. Fur-
thermore, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that Marathon directors did not breach
their state law fiduciary duty to their shareholders. Id. at 374.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. In the analogous context of S.E.C. rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1983), manipula-
tive refers to practices "that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activ-
ity." Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 199 (1976), the Court relied on a lOb-5 analysis, stating that "manipulative. . .connotes inten-
tional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affect-
ing the price of securities."
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bil or any other potential bidder would pay for Marathon3" and thus
established an artificial ceiling on the worth of Marathon's shares.31
Similarly, the court reasoned that the sheer size of the stock option (the
right to purchase one-sixth of Marathon's outstanding shares) combined
with its low price gave U.S. Steel an "artificial" or unfair competitive
advantage over other tender offerors.32 The Sixth Circuit concluded that
both lock-up options circumvented the "natural forces of market de-
mand," and therefore amounted to manipulative devices.33
The Sixth Circuit believed that its definition of manipulative practices
under section 14(e) comported with the purpose of the Williams Act.34
Without examining legislative history,35 the court asserted that Congress
intended to protect target shareholders 36 by providing tender offerors
with an "equal opportunity to compete in the market place" for a target
company's shares.37 The Sixth Circuit concluded that a cause of action
for manipulation can lie under the Williams Act regardless of whether
full disclosure occurs.3 8 The court justified this expansion of the scope of
the Act by finding that the Supreme Court's opinion in Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green39  does not limit the Act's coverage to
nondisclosures.'
The Marathon court limited its holding by refusing to devise a rule
30. 669 F.2d at 375; see supra note 21.
31. 669 F.2d at 375.
32. Id. at 375-76. The option was for 10 million shares at $90 per share. First Boston Corpora-
tion estimated that the stock option would cost any tender offeror seeking 40 million shares of Mara-
thon approximately 1.1 billion additional dollars to equal the U.S. Steel bid. A dollar increase in the
bidding would effectively cost U.S. Steel only $30 million while the cost to Mobil or another bidder
would be $47 million. Id.
33. Id. at 376.
34. Id.
35. 669 F.2d at 376; see also H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1983 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 330-31
(1983) (discussing the Marathon court's failure to examine legislative history).
36. See infra text accompanying notes 65-71.
37. 699 F.2d at 376-77.
38. Id. at 377.
39. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
40. 669 F.2d at 376. Discussing section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, in Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Supreme Court stated that the "fundamental purpose
'of the [Securities Exchange] Act. . .[is] a philosophy of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclo-
sure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the
statute." 430 U.S. at 478. The Supreme Court added that "nondisclosure is usually essential to the
success of a manipulative scheme." Id at 477. The Marathon court, like other circuit courts, used
section 10(b) to construe section 14(e) because of the similarities between the two anti-fraud
provisions.
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that would bar all options or lock-ups in a tender offer battle.4 Several
district courts took advantage of the limited holding in Marathon and
sought to distinguish the stock or asset agreement in the particular fact
pattern before them from the lock-up options in Marathon.42
B. Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp.
In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp. ,4 the Second Circuit rejected the
Sixth Circuit's approach. In January, 1981 the board of directors of the
Buffalo Forge Company ("Buffalo Forge") sought to resist an Ampco-
Pittsburgh Corporation ("Ampco") tender offer.4 These efforts resulted
in a merger agreement with the Ogden Corporation ("Ogden").45 Under
the merger plan, the Buffalo Forge directors approved a sale of shares of
Buffalo Forge treasury stock to Ogden,46 and granted Ogden a one-year
option to buy additional shares at the same price.47
Ampco and Ogden engaged in a bidding war out of which Ampco
emerged successful.48 After completing the takeover, Ampco declared
41. Id.
42. In Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I11. 1982), the court followed Mara-
thon. Id. at 949. The judge in Whittaker, however, refused to extend the analysis to agreements
between a target and white knight for the outright sale of a corporate asset-a subsidiary corpora-
tion of the target-through a tender offer scheme. Id. The court found that, unlike the Yates Field
lock-up in Marathon, the outright sale did not interfere artificially with the normal market for the
stock. Id.
In Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the Marshall Field Company
(Field) granted BATUS, Inc. two lock-up arrangements that the court determined were not anticom-
petitive and thus not manipulative devices violating section 14(e) of the Williams Act. Id at 421.
The first arrangement gave BATUS the right to purchase Field treasury stock at $25.50 per share.
The arrangement excused this purchase if BATUS or a third party obtained 51% of Field or if
BATUS kept its tender offer open until April 1, 1983. Id. at 420. The second arrangement gave
BATUS a right of first refusal on the purchase of Field's Chicago division property only if Field, or
any new management in a takeover, sought to sell the property within a year of the termination of
the Field-BATUS merger. Id. The district court explained that the securities laws should not bar
target management from using defensive tactics that are in the shareholders' best interest. Id. at 422;
see Recent Decisions, Lock-up Options Employed by Target Corporations as a Defensive Technique to
Unwanted Takeovers, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 926 (1983) (discussing Marathon and Marshall Field);
see also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y.), affd, 717 F.2d 757 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983).
43. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983).
44. The offer was for $25 per share. Id. at 758.
45. Id. The merger plan included an even swap of Buffalo Forge stock for Ogden stock, which,
at the time, was trading for $32.75. Id.
46. Id. The plan contemplated the sale of 425,000 shares at $32.75 per share. Id. The financing
of the Ogden stock purchase consisted of a nine percent note for $13,918,750. Id. at 758-59.
47. Id. at 758-59. This option was for 143,400 shares. Id.
48. Id. at,759. Ampco ultimately bid $37.50 per share. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss1/5
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the Ogden agreement null and void,4 9 and filed suit for recission of the
stock sale and stock option lock-ups. Ampco contended that the agree-
ment violated section 14(e) of the Williams Act, and that it resulted from
a breach of fiduciary duty by the old Buffalo Forge board. °
The district court held that the Buffalo Forge directors had not
breached their fiduciary duty"1 and that the stock arrangements were not
manipulative acts under section 14(e).5 2 The Second Circuit affirmed
and went beyond the district court's fiduciary duty finding to reject the
Marathon court's interpretation of the Williams Act. 53  The Buffalo
Forge court maintained that because the Williams Act requires only full
and fair disclosure in tender offers, a fully disclosed lock-up does not
constitute a misleading, manipulative act. 4
The Second Circuit argued that the sole purpose of the Williams Act is
to provide shareholders with the information needed to respond intelli-
gently to a cash tender offer.5 The court maintained, therefore, that acts
49. Id. Ampco refused to deliver Ogden's 425,000 shares, tender dividends to Ogden on its
stockholdings, or honor Ogden's exercise of its stock option. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The district court held that the Buffalo Forge directors opposed the Ampco tender offer
and that they had entered the merger agreement with Ogden because Ogden presented the best
available offer. According to the court, the directors had not acted out of self-interest. Id. (citing
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, 904 (W.D.N.Y.), affld, 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1983)).
52. 717 F.2d at 759. The district court sought to distinguish the Marathon decision rather than
reject it. The court pointed out that the lock-up options in Marathon were "intended to, and did,
foreclose competitive bidding for control of the corporation." 555 F. Supp. at 906. Neither Buffalo
Forge nor Ogden intended to prevent further bidding and the sale of treasury shares did not end the
bidding. Thus, the transactions were not manipulative acts. Id.
53. 717 F.2d at 760. In addition, the court implied that target directors should have the right
to exercise their business judgment in responding to a tender offer when the response is within the
bounds of their state law fiduciary duty. Id. at 759. The court held that Ampco's cause of action
failed because Ogden had fully disclosed the stock purchase and option lock-up and because the
Buffalo Forge directors had exercised proper business judgment in granting the lock-ups. Id.
54. Id. at 760.
55. Id. (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 31 (1977), and Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)); see also H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813.
The Buffalo Forge court found that Congress wanted the fully informed investor to determine
freely which tender offers were "fair and equitable." 717 F.2d at 760 (paraphrasing Edgar v. Mite
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982)). The court consequently determined that Congress' prohibition
against manipulative devices "was directed only at rigged transactions that might mislead investors
in the making of these decisions." 717 F.2d at 760.
The Second Circuit's notion of rigged transactions comes from Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 476-77 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court contended that "manipulation 'is virtually
a term of art when used in connection with securities markets.' . . . The term refers generally to
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are manipulative only if their disclosure misleads shareholders; fully dis-
closed defensive tactics that effect a stock's market price are not manipu-
lative within the meaning of the Williams Act.56 The court asserted that
Congress did not intend the Williams Act to favor either target manage-
ment or tender offerors. Thus, according to the court, Congress pro-
moted this neutrality by requiring disclosure rather than by regulating
the substantive terms of takeover bids.57
II. ANALYSIS OF THE SPLIT
The conflicting conclusions of the Sixth Circuit in Marathon and the
Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge result from differing conceptions of the
scope of the Williams Act. In particular, the courts differ over the mean-
ing of "manipulative" in section 14(e).
The Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder58 stated that ma-
nipulation under the securities laws "connotes intentional or willful con-
duct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securities."59 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,6°
the Court added that manipulation "refers generally to practices, such as
wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead
investors by artificially affecting market activity., 6 1
The Sixth Circuit focused on one clause in the Supreme Court's lan-
guage and defined manipulative acts as conduct artificially affecting mar-
ket activity. 62 The Sixth Circuit's definition was incomplete, however,
because it failed to construe the Court's language in its full context.
In contrast, the Second Circuit applied the Supreme Court's definition
practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors
by artificially affecting market activity." Id. at 476 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 199 (1976)); see Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1982). Wash sales,
matched orders, and price rigging are fictitious schemes that fraudulently give an investor a false
impression about a stock's worth. These schemes differ greatly from lock-up arrangements, which
are fully disclosed and result in stock being traded at a sometimes reappraised but not fraudulent
value. For definitions of the fictitious manipulation schemes, see Note, supra note 3, at 1112 nn.1 15-
17.
56. 717 F.2d at 760.
57. Id. ("Congress's concern was more with the procedural provisions of the Act than with the
substantive terms of takeover bids.").
58. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
59. Id. at 199.
60. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
61. Id. at 476. See supra note 55.
62. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 4, at 1073.
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in light of the legislative history. The court noted that Congress intended
the prohibition against manipulative practices to prevent management
from engaging in "rigged transactions" that could mislead uniformed in-
vestors.63 Thus, under the Second Circuit's definition, fully disclosed
stock and asset lock-ups are not manipulative acts under section 14(e). 6
The Supreme Court's analysis of the Williams Act's legislative history
provides further evidence that section 14(e) does not prohibit lock-ups.
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,65 the Court asserted that the
sponsors of the Williams Act "made it clear that the legislation was
designed solely to get needed information to the investor.",66 Based on
the Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative record, several circuit
courts, including the Second Circuit in Buffalo Forge, properly regard
misrepresentations, including misleading disclosures, as the "essential in-
gredient" for a cause of action under section 14(e).67
The Sixth Circuit in Marathon ignored the legislative history when
considering the scope of the Act. 6' The Sixth Circuit instead used its
own expansive definition of manipulative acts to determine that the Act
63. 717 F.2d at 760. For a discussion of rigged transactions, see supra note 55.
64. In both Marathon and Buffalo Forge the parties made the requisite disclosure, see supra
notes 16-26 & 47-54 and accompanying text; see also Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234
(8th Cir. 1984) (deception or misrepresentation is essential to a valid section 14(e) claim); Schreiber
v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.) (rejecting Marathon's interpretation of manipu-
lative devices and finding that "the Second Circuit's position, requiring some form of misrepresenta-
tion, represents a more accurate view of the Williams Act."), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984);
Gearheart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,667,
at 99,380-81 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1984) (manipulation exists only if challengers present evidence show-
ing that target intended to deceive, defraud, or mislead investors through use of a defensive tactic);
Dan River Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 285 (4th Cir. 1983); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 283 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1982 (1981).
65. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
66. Id. at 30-31 (assessing a remark made by Senator Williams); see 113 CONG. Rac. 24, 664
(1967) (statement of Senator Williams). Tender offers often forced shareholders to determine
whether it was in their best interest to tender all, some, or none of their shares, without any informa-
tion about the bidder on which to base their decision. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2812. In response, Congress enacted the
Williams Act to force disclosure of the tender offeror's competence, integrity, and future plans. Id.
Under the Act, Congress mandated full disclosure of circumstances surrounding tender offers. Id. at
2813. Shareholders, therefore, would have access to material information permitting them to make
intelligent decisions. Id.
67. 717 F.2d at 760; see Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1984);
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81
(1984); Atchley v. Qunaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1983).
68. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text; see also Swanson v. Wabash Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
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required more than disclosure to shareholders.69 If the Sixth Circuit had
examined the legislative history and its judicial interpretation, it would
have concluded that the Williams Act did not prohibit fully disclosed
lock-up arrangements between a target company and a white knight.70
Because investors received full, accurate, and timely disclosure of target
company lock-ups in both Buffalo Forge and Marathon, the lock-ups in
both cases should have been lawful under federal securities law.7"
III. REGULATING LOCK-UPS: STATE LAW FIDUCIARY DUTY AND
'THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Because federal securities laws do not provide a remedy, parties con-
testing fully disclosed lock-ups must resort to state law fiduciary stan-
dards for relief. In Buffalo Forge, the court simply limited the Williams
Act's coverage to failures to disclosure. It did not condone the use of
lock-ups. The Second Circuit stated that courts should not interfere with
the business judgment of a target company and intimated that state law
governing management's fiduciary duty should regulate the use of lock-
ups.
7 2
Extending the logic of Buffalo Forge, the Second Circuit in Data Probe
Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc. 73 held that section 14(e) does not au-
thorize federal courts to judge the substantive legality of lock-ups and
other target company responses to takeover bids.7 4 The court found that
69. 669 F.2d at 376.
70. The circuit courts addressing the issue since the Buffalo Forge decision have unanimously
rejected the Sixth Circuit's analysis and followed the Second Circuit's approach. Feldbaum v. Avon
Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984); Gearheart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc. [1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,667, at 99,368 (5th Cir. Aug. 31, 1984); Schreiber v. Burling-
ton Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
71. The Marathon decision presents an additional danger if courts interpret it to mean that the
Williams Act does not require misrepresentation. This logical extension of Marathon would permit
federal courts to "supervise the substantive fairness of practically all tender offers." Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984). The
resulting federalization of state corporate law by the judiciary, however, runs contrary to the
Supreme Court's instructions in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, the
Court stated that "[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize
the substantive portion of the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particu-
larly where established state policies of corporate regulations would be overridden." Id. at 479; see
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir.) ("until Congress directs other-
wise . . . shareholders like Schreiber must rely on the remedies provided by state law."), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
72. 717 F.2d at 759.
73. 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
74. Id. at 4. In response to Data Probe's undesirable tender offer, Datatab, Inc. (Datatab)
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plaintiffs challenging target management defensive tactics are actually al-
leging corporate mismanagement, which the Supreme Court has refused
to treat as actionable under federal law.75 The court concluded that
courts should evaluate the legitimacy of lock-ups under state law fiduci-
ary duty concepts rather than under section 14(e) of the Williams Act.7 6
State law governing a corporate director's fiduciary duty to a corpora-
tion and its shareholders creates two separate duties, a duty of care and a
duty of loyalty." The duty of care requires a director to exercise the care
that a reasonably prudent person would use under similar conditions.78
The duty of loyalty derives from the traditional prohibitions against self-
dealing in corporate transactions.79 Courts presume, pursuant to the
business judgment rule, that directors have satisfied these duties8" unless
the aggrieved shareholder demonstrates that the directors have engaged
in self-dealing, fraud, or bad faith.8' If a plaintiff makes this showing, the
burden of proof shifts to the directors to show that the contested transac-
tion was fair and reasonable to the corporation. 82 In the context of cor-
porate takeovers, courts focus primarily on the duty of loyalty. To
overcome the business judgment rule and implicate the duty of loyalty, a
plaintiff usually must show that self-interest was the director's primary
reason for entering a particular transaction."3
entered into a stock lock-up agreement with CRC Acquisition Corp. (CRC). Under the agreement,
CRC received a one-year irrevocable option to buy 1,407,674 authorized but unissued shares of
Datatab. Datatab thus effectively guaranteed CRC control of Datatab because only 703,836 shares
of Datatab common stock were outstanding. Data Probe sought to enjoin the lock-up option under
section 14(e) as a prohibited manipulative device, alleging that Datatab management acted for self-
serving reasons and thus deprived shareholders of a favorable financial opportunity. Id. at 3.
75, Id. at 4; accord Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234, 237 (8th Cir. 1984). The
Data Probe court based its reasoning on the Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
In Santa Fe, the Court refused to treat acts of corporate mismanagement as manipulative practices
in section 10(b) cases in which the real issue was whether management acted in the best interest of
shareholders. Id. at 477. In reference to manipulative practices under § 10(b), the Court main-
tained: "[w]e do not think it [Congress] would have chosen this 'term of art' [manipulative] if it had
meant to bring within the scope of § 10(b) instances of corporate mismanagement such as this, in
which the essence of the complaint is that shareholders were treated unfairly by a fiduciary." Id.
76. 722 F.2d at 4; see Note, supra note 1, at 623 & n.12.
77. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 225, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v.
Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701-02 (2d Cir. 1980).
81. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).
82, Id. at 382.
83. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980). Some judges have argued that
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Judicial application of these principles to corporate takeovers has
failed to regulate the substance of the merger transaction or the lock-ups
used to effect the merger. Courts have found, either as a matter of law84
or as a matter of fact,85 that plaintiffs have failed to establish self-interest
as the "primary motivating factor"8 6 and thus have not overcome the
presumption that directors have fulfilled their duty. These cases indicate
that very few plaintiffs will be able to sustain their burden of proof.8 7
Even if a plaintiff is able to rebut the presumption of loyalty, the direc-
tors only need to show that their approval or disapproval of a merger or
lock-up transaction had a valid business purpose.88 Although the real
purpose of the directors' decision may have been to preserve their jobs,
proof of a valid business purpose for a transaction will satisfy the
courts. 9 Whether directors have breached their fiduciary duty does not
depend upon whether the transaction was in the shareholders' best inter-
est.f0 Directors thus must meet a relatively easy burden to vindicate
their actions.9
Courts, therefore, should reach the reasonableness of lock-ups as a
matter of law. In corporate takeovers, directors of target corporations
are inherently self-interested because they possess a strong desire to re-
tain their jobs.92 Courts should not strictly apply the business judgment
courts should lower the standard to shift the burden of proof upon a showing that self-interest was
merely a motivating factor in the directors' action. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 304 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 299-301 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., concurring and dissenting). Courts, however, have rejected
a lower standard. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980).
84. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 301 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn, J., concurring and
dissenting).
85. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
87. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); cases cited supra
notes 84-85. A plaintiff has prevailed in one case. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255
(2d Cir. 1984). The court, however, failed to mention which of the two standards governed its
finding. Id. at 264-65.
88. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980).
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028,
1054-55 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to
a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1175 (1981); Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties
of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. Rv. 403, 419-20 (1980); Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 819, 825 (1981).
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rule in these situations. Rather, they should move directly to an exami-
nation of the fairness and reasonableness of the lock-up.
The current application of the business judgment rule provides direc-
tors with excessive protection by creating a presumption too difficult for
plaintiffs to rebut 93 and by making the directors' burden of proof too easy
to fulfill.9
4
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The lack of effective federal and state regulation provides a compelling
reason for Congress to enact new federal legislation regulating defensive
tactics.95 While federal law primarily regulates tender offerors, inade-
quate state law controls management's use of defensive tactics.96 New
federal legislation must fill this gap in the law. 97
Defensive tactics affect a class of persons that transcends state bounda-
ries. Although corporations are creations of an individual state,
problems stemming from defensive tactics are national in scope. Both
Congress and the SEC acknowledge that federal controls would provide
stable and consistent protection for shareholders against self-serving
management.9 8
Two separate legislative proposals would meet these concerns: one
93. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
95. See Comment, Tender Offers, Lock-Ups, and the Williams Act: A Critical Analysis of Mobil
Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co, 21 DuQ. L. REv. 669, 706 (1983) ("Presently ... there is no place for
fiduciary analysis in federal securities regulation. If there is a need for federalization of this standard
of corporate review, it is for Congress to accomplish, not the judiciary under the guise of tortured
interpretation .. ").
In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), Judge Polleck
clearly stated the problem: "There must be some radical defect or gap in existing securities and
corporation law and regulation" if directors of a corporation may "deal with [the corporation's]
assets and its life in retaliation for a hostile tender [in a manner] not otherwise intended or defensible
as good corporate business." Id. at 861 quoted in Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Take-
overs: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249, 316-17 (1983).
96. See SEC Endorses Major Changes in Merger Fights, Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
97. Although many commentators believe that the federal government should refrain from pre-
empting state corporate law, see The SEC Today, Aug. 3, 1984, at 1; Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 4,
col. 1, they nevertheless recognize both the harm that lock-ups pose to shareholders and the difficul-
ties faced in correcting state law. See Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1984, at 4, col. 1.
98. Spurred to action by the SEC's Advisory Panel on Tender Offers, recommendations, and
SEC draft legislation, Congress drafted and is considering a tender offer reform bill, H.R. 5693, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), and a shareholder remedy bill, H.R. 5972, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The
pending bills attempt to curb target management defensive tactics such as golden parachutes (lucra-
tive change-of-control clauses in management employment contracts) and greenmail (target
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general, directed at all defensive tactics, and one specific, aimed solely at
regulating lock-ups. These proposals could function independently or in
combination.
A. Regulating Defensive Tactics
Congress should modify the business judgment rule in cases where liti-
gants question directors' responses to hostile tender offers. Under the
proposed law, plaintiff shareholders would have to demonstrate that di-
rectors' defensive tactics probably would result in retention of manage-
ment and injury to shareholders.99 Upon such a showing, the burden
should shift to the directors to prove that their tactics would be in the
shareholders' best interest.1" Courts should find that directors have sat-
isfied their burden if they demonstrate that the benefits to the target cor-
poration were greater than the benefits to incumbent management.101
This proposal would accomplish two objectives. First, it implicitly
recognizes that directors have an inherent conflict of interest. The pro-
posed law would address this problem by giving shareholders the ability
to bring an effective challenge to directors' defensive tactics and thus to
discourage directors from authorizing imprudent defenses. Second, this
proposal would provide an immediate remedy for shareholders, who can-
purchases hostile tender offeror's shares at a premium). These bills also seek to provide shareholders
with an adequate remedy to challenge directors' tactics by modifying the business judgment rule.
99. See SEC Legislative Proposals, Proxy Rules Discussed at ABA Section Meeting, CORPORATE
PRACTICE SERIES (BNA) No. 280, at 2 (April 24, 1984) (paraphrasing John J. Huber, director of the
SEC's Division of Corporate Finance). When no hostile tender offer is pending, defensive tactics
instituted by management would be exempt from this proposal. Id.
Shareholders could prove injury by showing that they have suffered an economic loss or were
deprived of an economic gain as result of the defensive maneuver.
100. Id
101. Id. For example, assume that the management of company X uses outdated and inefficient
management techniques and has failed to integrate new technology into its office and manufacturing
operations. Company X's officers also receive four months paid vacation a year regardless of how
long they have been working for the company. The result is that company X suffers from declining
profits in an industry that is witnessing tremendous growth and prosperity.
Now assume that company Y, a propsering company in the same industry as X that is respected
for its innovative management, tenders an offer for a controlling amount of X's stock. X's directors
declare the tender offer hostile and authorize X to purchase at a premium all of the shares of X that
Y possesses in exchange for the cancellation of the tender offer (this defensive tactic is called "green-
mail"). A court assessing the challenged use of greenmail would be justified in finding that the
defensive tactic was far less beneficial for shareholders of X (who were deprived of tendering their
shares at an above the market price, and of ridding company X of ineffective management) than for
management (who retained their jobs).
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not afford to wait for any haphazard, uncertain development of protec-
tive law in state courts.
Congress is already examining a shareholder remedy bill, H.R. 5972,
that would modify the business judgment rule.10 2 H.R. 5972 would place
the burden on directors to prove that the challenged defensive action was
both prudent for the corporation and fair to shareholders. Although
H.R. 5972 would rectify the injustice of a strict adherence to the business
judgment rule, it unfairly places the entire burden of proof on the
directors.
The main objective in modifying the business judgment rule is to make
the rule responsive to situations in which "management places their own
survival with the best interests of their shareholders."1 3  Plaintiffs
should, therefore, have the burden of proving that a particular defensive
tactic was motivated by managerial self-interest. Under this proposal,
shareholders would make such a showing by proving that a defensive
transaction probably would result in employment security for incumbent
management. 104
B. Regulating Lock-ups
Congress should require corporations to seek shareholder approval
whenever directors resist a hostile takeover attempt by granting a third
party an option to buy significant amounts of stock or significant assets of
the corporation. 10 The SEC would define "significant" in a manner that
would afford shareholders the opportunity to vote on lock-ups that mate-
rially affect the corporation, its assets, business, capital structure, and
102. H.R. 5972, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
103. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1984, at 8E, col. 1 (quoting securities professor Joel Seligman).
104. Cf. Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (no breach of directors'
fiduciary duty; court relied heavily on the failure of a merger agreement with a white knight to
provide the majority of target management with job security). Critics of federalizing the business
judgment rule stress that such legislation is objectionable because it alters federal-state relationships.
CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES (BNA) No. 302, at 1, col. 2 (Oct. 2, 1984) (comments of Securities
and Exchange Commissioner Charles L. Marinaccio); see generally CORPORATE PRACTICE SERIES,
(BNA), No. 303, at 8, col. 1 (Oct. 9, 1984) (Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan voiced his
concern over pending tender offer legislation because it "would intrude unnecessarily into state law
and constitute an unwarranted step toward imposition of substantive federal corporate law").
105. See Lowenstein, supra note 95. Professor Lowenstein advocates legislation requiring target
management to secure shareholder approval of any defensive tactics that cause "structural changes"
in the target. See also Goldsmith, Hostile Takeovers Easier to Swallow Than Poison Pills, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 11, 1985, at 16, col. 3 (advocating that shareholders should vote on resolutions to institute
"shark repellents" to counter hostile tender offers).
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shareholder voting rights.1" 6
For directors to have adequate time to complete a shareholder proxy,
tender offers must remain open longer than the present twenty-day pe-
riod. H.R. 5972 would extend the period to sixty days. 10 7 Management
would need the longer period to formulate and negotiate a satisfactory
lock-up agreement, to file proxy materials with the SEC and distribute
them to shareholders, and to receive the results of shareholder voting on
the arrangement. An open offer period for hostile tender offers of three
to four months probably would suffice. 108
This proposal would shift the responsibility for approving lock-ups to
those persons whose interest is at stake and eliminate management's con-
flict of interest. In addition, management could analyze and investigate
more carefully responses that would benefit shareholders. 109 Finally,
106. See id. at 255, 317-18.
107. H.R. 5972, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). Under H.R. 5972, the sixty-day period would not
apply to tender offers solicited by the target company if such offers are not in anticipation of another
offer for the same class of securities. Id. The SEC voiced objections to the proposed increase in the
minimum period for tendering stock. H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The SEC contended
that the current twenty-day period strikes an adequate balance between providing shareholders with
sufficient time to contemplate responses to tender offers and preserving neutrality in tender offer
regulation. CORPORATE PRACTcE SERIES (BNA) No. 301, at 7, col. I (Sept. 25, 1984). The SEC
argued that the proposed lengthening of the "time frame for investors to evaluate tender offers" was
unwarranted. Id.
In his introduction of H.R. 5972, Senator Timothy Wirth explained the need for extending the
minimum offering period:
It appears that much of the frantic nature of the current takeover process is brought on by
the fact that, under current law, a tender offer can be effected in as little as 20 business
days. In the view of many experts, many of the abusive defensive tactics used by manage-
ment are simply efforts to buy time. In testimony before the subcommittee, State securities
administrators, academics, and at least one prominent investment banker, Felix Rohatyn,
argued that the tender-offer process would operate in a much more considered and rational
atmosphere if there were more time provided. Mr. Rohatyn, the State regulators, and
others suggested 60 days as the minimum offering period. I have included such a provision
in the bill introduced today.
CONG. REc. H7441 (daily ed. June 18, 1984). See also Letter from Martin Lipton to Senator Al-
fonse M. D'Amato and Representative Timothy E. Wirth (Nov. 20, 1984). As part of the proposed
Shareholder Protection and Elimination of Takeover Abuses Act of 1985, Martin Lipton advocates
that tender offers must be held open for 60 calendar days to reduce the time pressure on boards of
directors.
108. Professor Lowenstein proposes that tender offers should remain open for six months. Low-
enstein, supra note 95, at 317. He suggests, however, that four months would be the bare minimum.
Id. at 323.
109. See Letter from Martin Lipton to Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato and Representative
Timothy E. Wirth (Nov. 20, 1984) (discussing proposed Shareholder Protection and Elimination of
Takeover Abuses Act of 1985) ("Extension of the tender offer period will give shareholders and
boards of directors needed time to evaluate fully the merits of an unsolicited tender offer without
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lessened time constraints and increased competition might attract more
potential buyers to the bidding process, thereby bringing a higher price
for target company shares. 10
The proposal, however, raises several problems. Does this democratic
solution create inefficiency and economic cost problems for a target com-
pany? Will the proposal discourage the unseating of inefficient, subpar
management by spreading the impact of the tender offer over four
months?"' Will a longer tender offer result in increased costs for the
tender offeror and the target company by creating more time for litiga-
tion and maneuvering by both parties?"1 2 Does the tender offer period
unduly favor target management and thus impede the Williams Act's
pursuit of neutrality?
Although these concerns are important for Congress to consider, the
status quo provides little or no more relief from these problems than the
proposed solution. Because shareholders, rather than self-interested di-
rectors, should decide the ultimate fate of their corporation and invest-
ments, the adverse effect of the proposed legislation would not outweigh
the benefits the legislation would bring to the hostile tender offer arena.
In addition, enactment of these legislative solutions, either together or
separately, ultimately would advance directors to a more responsible
plane of responding to shareholders' needs and desires in tender offer
situations.
Douglas M. Baron
being subjected to the kind of intense pressure that now often leave a board with no choice but to act
hastily and, in some cases, rashly.").
110. See generally id. at 255-56.
111. See id. at 324-35.
112. See id. at 325-26.
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